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During the recent financial crisis, 325 U.S. banks failed whereas only 24 banks failed from 2000-
2006. It is important to identify how banks’ operations and changes in the economic environment 
might influence the total risk level faced by U.S. banking institutions in order to avoid the 
number of bank failures experienced during the recent recession. This study analyzes publicly 
traded banks in the U.S. from 1978 to 2010. Various accounting ratios and macroeconomic 
indicators are used as proxies for the effects of individual bank operations and changes in the 
economic environment. Total risk, as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE, is 
regressed against the accounting ratios and economic indicators to identify the important sources 
of total risk. Bank size, the equity to asset ratio, allowance for loan loss ratio, liquidity ratio, loan 
to asset ratio, growth in real GDP, growth in the money supply and the interest rate spread all 






From 2000-2006, only 24 banks failed in the United States, yet from 2007-2010, which 
was the time that coincided with the recent recession and financial crisis, 325 banks failed in the 
U.S. (FDIC).  Depositors and investors have a significant interest in the health of banking 
institutions. When a bank fails, depositors stand to lose out on any money that is not insured by 
the FDIC and equity investors will undoubtedly incur substantial losses. It is important to 
identify possible determinants of total risk for banking companies in order to avoid the losses 
associated with a bank’s failure. This research paper aims to analyze the association that changes 
in the economic environment and firm specific accounting ratios have with the total risk level 
faced by banks. The inclusion of economic indicators as possible sources of total risk for banks 
is the main contribution of this study. 
Some of the existing literature on bank risk looks at how accounting ratios relate to 
market risk for banks. Market risk is the risk that affects the entire banking industry, such as 
changes in the economic environment like recessions. Firm-specific risk is the risk that is unique 
to each individual bank. Sources of firm-specific risk include business and financial risk. 
Business risk includes risk that arises from a firm’s operations like generating a sufficient 
amount of income to cover operating expenses or even meeting the pension obligations for 
retirees(Mayo, 2008). Financial risk addresses the risk associated with management’s decisions 
or ability and a company’s financial strength (Mayo, 2008). Basically, firm-specific risk is the 
risk that arises from the operations, performance or managerial decisions at each bank. When 
added together, market risk and firm-specific risk combine to form total risk. Total risk is the risk 
measure that is used in this study and it is appropriate because it includes the risks that affect 
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each individual bank as well as market risk, or the risk that affects the entire banking industry 
(Agusman et al., 2008).  
The results of this research can help to minimize some of the consequences associated 
with bank failures. If it is found that changes in the economic environment are in fact 
significantly related to a bank’s total risk level, then when indicators suggest the country is going 
through an economic downturn, banks can adjust their operations accordingly to protect against 
the higher risk level. Further implications of this study relate to the accounting ratios used as 
proxies for the various sources of risk for banks. The statistically significant accounting ratios 
that increase risk can be identified and bank management can closely monitor these measures, or 
regulators can impose stricter regulations on the values for these metrics. Similarly, the 
statistically significant ratios that reduce risk can be used as tools to strengthen the financial 
health of a bank and help it to be more resilient during a recession.  
Section II outlines some of the existing research in this area where changes in the 
economic environment have not been considered as a possible source of total risk for banks. The 
hypotheses of this study and the variables used in the regression models are explained in Section 
III. Section IV covers the data and methodology used in this study, Section V covers the results 
and Section VI contains the conclusions of this research.  
II. Literature Review 
It has been noted that large, publicly traded institutions possess a large percentage of assets in 
the banking industry and “present the greatest risk to the deposit-insurance fund and to the 
stability of the banking system” (Pettway and Sinkey, 1980). The rising number of bank failures 
in the U.S. is a cause for analyzing the risk of banking companies (Mansur et al., 1993). The risk 
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level of a banking institution can be determined with the use of accounting data, which is a tool 
used to distinguish sound from unsound banking (Pettway and Sinkey, 1980).  
The majority of studies attempt to identify which accounting and financial ratios prove to be 
the sources of market risk and total risk. The consensus amongst the literature has been to 
measure market risk with beta and total risk by the standard deviation of returns (Lee and 
Brewer, 1985; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and Zitz, 1993; Pettway, 1976; Agusman et 
al., 2008) . But in the findings of a comparison study, accounting and financial ratios better 
explain total risk as opposed to market risk (Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980).  
An important distinction about a bank’s risk assessment concerns the usefulness of the risk 
measure for the purpose it is being used. A measure of market risk would be important for an 
equity investor because the market measure of risk, beta, is useful in determining the riskiness of 
a particular stock that might be added to an investment portfolio (Agusman et al., 2008). 
However, a bank regulator would be more concerned with a measure of total risk, like the 
standard deviation of return on assets or equity, to assess the financial health and risk of default 
for a banking institution (Agusman et al., 2008). Agusman et al. (2008) addresses these 
differences in a study analyzing the link between accounting ratios and capital market measures 
of risk for 46 Asian banks from 1998-2003. In their study, the standard deviation of return on 
assets is found to be a significant proxy for total risk and the loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans 
variable is significantly related to total risk. 
Risk is said to be strongly influenced by a bank’s management decisions and those decisions 
can be reflected in a bank’s financial statements which make accounting ratios a viable proxy for 
such decisions (Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Lee and Brewer, 1985). A study of 95 commercial 
banks and bank holding companies from 1972 to 1976 finds that the dividend payout ratio, 
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variability of deposits and earnings, the equity to total asset ratio, loan loss reserves ratio and a 
liquidity measure are all statistically significant in predicting a measure of total risk (Jahankhani 
and Lynge, 1980). In fact, the accounting ratios used in this study are able to explain 43% of the 
variation in total risk for a bank as opposed to 25% of the variability in market risk, suggesting 
that accounting ratios are better predictors of total risk measures than market risk measures 
(Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980).   
Another comparison study of 44 U.S. banks from 1979-1982 finds that accounting ratios 
demonstrate more consistent results in relation to total risk despite a slight change in the model. 
The equity to asset ratio, foreign income, foreign deposit exposure, volatile liabilities and the net 
position of market rate assets are all significantly related to total risk (Lee and Brewer, 1985).  
In a study of 59 U.S. banks from 1986-1990, only the cash and due from banks liquidity ratio 
proves to be significant in relation to total risk (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). Variables that are 
significant in some time periods are not always found to be significant in studies of different time 
periods. The equity to deposit and loan loss reserve variables are insignificant in this study while 
significant in others. Mansur and Zitz (1993) attribute the difference in results across studies to 
the use of different banks and different ratios. A study spanning a longer time period could help 
mitigate some of the variation in the results of the existing literature that can be attributed to 
looking at different time periods.  
An overview of the literature shows that the economy has not been considered a source of 
risk for banking companies. Also, many studies are concerned with how financial ratios are 
related to market risk, or the risk that cannot be mitigated by an investor through diversification. 
The goal of the current study is not only to include the economy as a source of risk for banks, but 
also to use a measure of total risk instead of market risk. Market risk does not incorporate firm-
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specific risk. Firm-specific risk is the risk that is unique to each bank and it is caused by 
management decisions, policies and operations. A measure of total risk not only accounts for 
market risk, it also accounts for firm-specific risk which is important when looking at banks 
because different banks use different assets with different risk levels and they have different 
lending qualifications.  
III. Hypothesis, Methodology and Variables 
The literature discussed above leads to the general hypothesis that changes in the economic 
environment, as measured by macroeconomic indicators, are significantly related to total risk, in 
addition to bank decisions, which are reflected in accounting ratios from financial statement data. 
The model being used to test this hypothesis is: 
SDROE = β0 - β1Size - β2Equity/Asset + β3 Loan Loss - β4Liquidity + β5 Loan/Asset 
- β6Dividend Payout - β7GDP Growth +/- β8M2 Growth  
+ β9Interest Rate Gap+ εi 
where the trailing three year standard deviation of return on equity (SDROE) is the dependent 
variable and it serves as a measure for total risk. An alternative measure of total risk is the 
trailing three year standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) which will also be used in this 
study as a means to test the robustness of the results. These trailing three year standard deviation 
of return variables measure the volatility in a banking firm’s earnings ratios in an attempt to 
capture the total risk level for a bank that is not affected by short term fluctuations.  The data are 
analyzed in four different models: 1) the base model, 2) a model with fixed-effects for time, 3) a 
model with fixed-effects for each firm and 4) then a model with fixed-effects for both time and 
each firm. The fixed-effect variables are dummy variables designed to capture any unobserved 
characteristics that are unique to each year and each firm. To measure the fixed-effects of time in 
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this study, a dummy variable is used for each year resulting in a total of 33 time fixed-effect 
variables for each of the 33 years in this study. The variables measure the unobserved 
characteristics that are unique to each distinct time period and which cannot be captured by other 
variables in the model. Historically, banks have attempted to mask their true risk levels by 
temporarily lowering their debt just before the end of a reporting period which results in a 
skewed representation of their true risk level (Kelly et al., 2010). The time fixed-effect variables 
can highlight any specific years that exhibit substantially higher risk levels, particularly those 
leading up to the recent financial crisis. The firm fixed-effect variables are used to capture the 
unobserved characteristics, such as management decisions and corporate culture, which are 
unique to each individual firm and yet, impact the total risk level faced by that bank. Such 
important factors cannot be accounted for with any quantitative metric, so a dummy variable is 
used to capture the cumulative effect of these factors on total risk. Each of these models will be 
analyzed using linear regressions to test the significance of each model and the individual 
variables. 
Table 1 provides variable definitions and the expected signs. The independent variables 
represent accounting data from financial statements and macroeconomic indicators to reflect 
changes in the economic environment. All the variables reflect quarterly values. 
Size 
The size variable is the log of total assets for each bank.  The expected relationship 
between bank size and total risk is negative. Large banks tend to be more diversified which 
allows them to engage in riskier and potentially more profitable lending without increasing risk 
because of a diversification advantage (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).  Likewise, smaller firms 




Equity to Asset Ratio 
This variable is the ratio of total shareholder equity to total assets. This variable identifies 
the percent of total assets which shareholders contribute. It is expected that a negative 
relationship exists between the equity to asset ratio and total risk because a larger percentage of 
operations are funded by raised capital rather than borrowed funds, which are accompanied by 
the added cost of interest expense (Pettway, 1976; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Agusman et al., 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
  
Variable Formula Definition 
Expected 
Sign 
Size Log of Total Assets 
Accounts for the size of a banking 
institution - 
Equity Asset 
Total Shareholder Equity  
/ Total Assets 
Identifies the percent of assets that 
shareholders contribute - 
Loan Loss 
Allowance for Loan Losses  
/ Gross Loans 
The percent of loans a bank does 
not expect to collect upon + 
Liquidity 
Cash and Due from Banks  
/ Total Assets 
A measure of a bank's ability to 
absorb unexpected changes in its 
asset and liability accounts - 
Loan Asset Gross Loans / Total Assets 
The percent of total assets which 
are held in loans outstanding + 
Dividend Payout 
(Common Stock Dividends 
+ Preferred Stock 
Dividends) / Net Income 
Management’s expectations about 
future net income - 
GDP Growth 
GDP of the Current Quarter 
/ GDP of the Previous 
Quarter The quarterly growth in GDP - 
M2 Growth 
Money Supply of the 
Current Quarter / Money 
Supply of the Previous 
Quarter 
The quarterly growth in Money 
Supply (M2) +/- 
Interest Rate Gap 
Yield on the 10 year 
Treasury Bond - Federal 
Funds Rate 
Measures the interest rate spread 
between the 10 year Treasury and 
the Federal Funds Rate + 
SDROE The standard deviation of the three year trailing return on equity Dependent 
SDROA The standard deviation of the three year trailing return on assets  Dependent 
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2008). This variable was found to be perfectly correlated with the equity to deposit ratio which 
has also been used in the literature, but this study opts to use the equity to asset ratio due to its 
more frequent use as observed by the author of this study. 
Allowance for Loan Losses 
 The allowance for loan losses serves as a proxy for credit risk.  It represents the percent 
of a bank’s loans that are expected to result in losses due to slow payment and default. It is an 
indicator of the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. A larger ratio indicates that a greater percent of 
a bank’s loans are bad and expected to default, meaning the bank will not get repaid and the loan 
becomes a loss (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). Thus, it is anticipated that a positive relationship with 
total risk exists for this variable. 
Liquidity 
 The liquidity variable is the ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets. As its name 
indicates, it is a proxy for liquidity risk because this variable measures the percent of assets 
which are held in very liquid and short term assets like cash. It is believed that a higher ratio, 
which indicates greater liquidity, translates into less total risk, so liquidity is expected to be 
negatively related to total risk (Agusman et al., 2008; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and 
Zitz, 1993). Firms that maintain higher levels of liquidity are expected to be able to absorb 
unexpected losses in the short run, due to a greater amount of liquid assets available, and avoid 
the risk of illiquidity.  
Loan to Asset Ratio 
 This is a proxy for liquidity risk and it measures the percent of assets which are held in 
outstanding loans (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). A high ratio is an indicator of potential liquidity 
issues because loans are not usually callable and they tie up funds which could otherwise be held 
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in more liquid assets, like cash, and used to address unexpected losses.  It is expected that the 
loan to asset ratio is positively related to total risk because the issuance of  loans reduces the 
amount of capital available to meet short term or unexpected obligations which might give rise to 
liquidity issues (Agusman et al., 2008; Mansur and Zitz, 1993). This variable was found to be 
highly correlated with the loan to deposit ratio, but much like the equity to asset ratio, and 
because of the more frequent use of the loan to asset ratio in prior studies, it is used in this study. 
Dividend Payout 
 This ratio is calculated as the percent of net income paid out in dividends. This variable is 
expected to reflect the bank management’s expectations about future net income because most 
firms want to achieve stable dividends and they set the dividends to be paid amount at a value 
which they are confident they can cover with net income (Lee and Brewer, 1985). Thus, firms 
that have a higher dividend payout ratio are more confident that they can generate higher levels 
of net income and cover the dividends paid amount. It is expected that a higher ratio, which 
means a firm’s management is confident they can consistently generate sufficient levels of net 
income, will lead to less total risk and thus, exhibit a negative relationship.  
GDP Growth 
 GDP Growth is the first of the macroeconomic indicator variables. It reflects changes in 
the economic environment as it measures the quarterly change in real GDP. This variable has 
been used as a proxy for economic activity as a ratio of less than one indicates a decline in 
economic activity (Jokipii and Milne, 2007). It is expected that banks will face greater risk 
during periods of contracting economic activity, so the GDP Growth variable is expected to be 





 This variable measures the quarterly growth in the money supply. Banks generate profit 
off of interest income they receive from issuing loans. As M2 grows, and more money circulates 
in the economy, banks should be able to make more loans and generate more profits which will 
help them accumulate reserves that can be used to improve the credit quality and financial 
strength of the bank. Larger profits would allow a bank greater financial flexibility to use extra 
reserves as a buffer against liquidity problems or for the purpose of deleveraging. Such an 
argument would suggest that growth in the money supply is negatively related to total risk, but a 
strong argument can also be made for the contrary. The Federal Reserve sometimes chooses to 
inject money into the economy during periods of uncertainty in an effort to build confidence. So 
when markets are volatile and confidence is low amongst individuals, the Fed can opt for 
monetary “easing” which might suggest that growth in M2 occurs during highly volatile or high 
risk periods. This argument would suggest a positive relationship exists between total risk and 
growth in the money supply and thus, an anticipated relationship between growth in M2 and total 
risk cannot be determined. 
Interest Rate Gap 
 The interest rate gap is the spread, or difference, between the yield on the 10 year U.S. 
Treasury bond and the federal funds rate at the end of each quarterly period. The yield on the 10 
year Treasury bond is a benchmark for long term interest rates while the federal funds rate 
reflects the rate that member banks charge each other for overnight loans (short term). This 
variable captures the inflation risk present in the economy (Snyder, 2005). When uncertainty 
about inflation arises, it tends to have more influence over long term interest rates instead of 
short term rates. As the risk of inflation becomes more serious, investors will demand a higher 
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yield on long term investment options because of the influence that inflating prices could have in 
a ten year period. On the other hand, a fear of inflation might not cause the same increase in 
short term interest rates because of the lesser degree of influence that inflation can have in the 
short run versus the long run. It is expected that a larger spread between short term and long term 
rates will indicate greater uncertainty about inflation and thus, be positively related to total risk.  
IV. Data  
 The data used in this study comes from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
online database at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business. This study 
includes a sample of 326 U.S. banks that are analyzed over the quarterly periods from 1978-
2010. The banks used in this study are publicly traded and classified as Major Banks of the 
Finance Industry by the Nasdaq Exchange. This study does not follow all 326 companies for 
each quarter from 1978-2010. Some companies were not incorporated in 1978 and do not enter 
the study until the 1980’s, 1990’s or 2000’s while other companies appear in the study from the 
very beginning but then leave the study when they are acquired or fail. By allowing for the 
inclusion of companies that are present for only a fraction of the time period of this study, the 
risk of having the results of this study influenced by a survival bias can be overcome. Only 21 
companies are represented in every year of the study, but if this study were limited to only these 
21 companies it would not capture what occurred at struggling or failing institutions that were 
acquired by other banks or left to fail. Because of the trailing nature of the SDROE variable, the 
included companies in this study must have been incorporated for at least three years so that this 
variable could be calculated. Thus, companies that enter at some point after 1978 are beginning 
their fourth year of incorporation when they appear in this study because they first need to record 




The summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 2 and the 
regression results of this study can be found in Table 3.  
 
For the purpose of the interpretation of the results, Model 1 is used. In this model the core 
variables are regressed against total risk (SDROE) without the use of time or firm fixed-effect 
variables.  Regression results are also included for the four models with the trailing three year 
standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) as the dependent variable. The inclusion of these 
models is a test for the robustness of the results because SDROA has also been used as an 
alternative measure of total risk (Agusman et al., 2008).  
The coefficient on the size variable is negative and statistically significant. This suggests 
that larger firms, or those with more total assets, experience less total risk. The results of Model 
1 produce the expected negative relationship between bank size and total risk. In the SDROE 
regressions, the negative relationship was a consistent result except in Model 3, but the 
Table 2: Summary Statistics   
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Size 6.875 11.374 8.381 0.684 
Equity/Asset 0.003 0.262 0.087 0.023 
Loan Loss 0 0.114 0.015 0.008 
Liquidity 0 0.410 0.049 0.050 
Loans/Asset 0 .948 0.560 0.267 
Dividend Payout -1.999 1.997 0.275 0.359 
GDP Growth 0.980 1.039 1.006 0.007 
M2 Growth 0.996 1.057 1.014 0.008 
IR Gap -6.060 3.850 1.476 1.513 
SDROE 7.16E-05 4.011 0.019 0.107 
SDROA 3.73E-06 0.326 0.001 0.004 
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coefficient for size in that model was statistically insignificant. The results for this variable are 
the opposite when using a regression with the SDROA as the dependent variable. In these 
models, size has a positive and significant result with total risk. When comparing the regressions 
with the different dependent variables, larger banks experience less volatility with respect to 
return on equity, but greater volatility with respect to return on assets.  
The equity to asset ratio yielded the expected sign and was statistically significant in all 
models. The relationship between this ratio and total risk is negative, meaning that firms who 
utilize more equity to finance their operations experience less total risk. This seems intuitive 
because equity capital is cheaper than the alternative of borrowed money which comes with the 
added cost of interest expense. Firms that can raise more funds instead of having to borrow them 
should have greater financial flexibility and be more financially sound than banks that borrow 
large sums of money and are obligated to make large interest payments, even if they might be 
operating at a loss. 
The coefficient for the allowance for loan loss ratio is statistically significant in all 
models and it has the expected positive sign. This ratio is positively related to total risk for 
banks. As a measure of the expected losses and actual loan write-offs in a bank’s loan portfolio, 
these results suggest that banks who estimate larger losses on loans will face more risk because 
the quality of their loan portfolio is not as good. 
The liquidity ratio exhibits a positive relationship with total risk which is the opposite of 
what is expected. It is expected that banks who hold excess liquidity will face lower risk because 
they have greater financial flexibility to meet unexpected charges or losses in the short run. 
However, all of the regression models, with both dependent variables, suggest that the opposite 
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is true; excess liquidity actually increases a banking firm’s total risk. It has been argued that 
firms who hold excess liquidity make inefficient use of the excess capital. Excess capital is 
Table 3: Regression Results               
  SDROE SDROA 
Variables 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
(Constant) 1.00 0.009 0.625 0.025 0.034 -0.009 0.015 -0.01 
4.686** 0.03 3.194** 0.1 4.371** -0.884 1.963* -1.043 
Size 
-0.009 -0.01 0.004 -0.009 .000 .000 .000 .000 
-6.596** -7.592** 1.571 -2.675** -5.167** -5.361** 3.156** -0.91 
Equity/Asset 
-0.417 -0.501 -0.958 -1.098 -0.005 -0.008 -0.017 -0.021 
-10.696** -12.614** -19.174** -21.349** -3.597** -5.372** -8.593** -10.846** 
Loan Loss 
2.472 2.213 2.801 2.3 0.112 0.099 0.113 0.092 
22.150** 18.717** 24.641** 18.583** 27.520** 22.880** 25.865** 19.293** 
Liquidity 
0.094 0.093 0.219 0.22 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.006 
4.665** 4.138** 9.075** 8.070** 6.454** 4.628** 8.159** 6.003** 
Loans/Asset 
0.027 -0.012 0.049 0.04 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
6.739** -1.877 9.668 4.888** 11.316** 3.941** 6.961** 2.290* 
Dividend Payout 
-4.781E-6 -7.183E-6 -4.377E-6 -6.376E-6 -2.55E-7 -3.32E-7 -2.00E-7 -2.708E-7 
-0.517 -0.78 -0.544 -0.794 -0.751 -0.986 -0.644 -0.876 
GDP Growth 
-0.657 -0.089 -0.441 -0.12 -0.023 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 
-4.992** -0.484 -3.764** -0.775 -4.783** -0.168 -2.968** -0.165 
M2 Growth 
-0.267 0.2 -0.209 0.209 -0.01 0.012 -0.005 0.012 
-2.270* 1.327 -2.012* 1.603 -2.349* 2.160* -1.204 2.470* 
IR Gap 
0.003 .000 0.001 .000 .000 -2.85E-5 .000 .-1.329E-5 
4.469** -0.219 2.703** -0.106 8.206** 0.549 7.004** 0.263 
Time Fixed-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm Fixed-effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R square 0.049 0.058 0.291 0.298 0.072 0.083 0.234 0.243 
F Value 90.563 24.515 20.222 19.125 135.334 35.283 15.316 14.749 
The top number for each variable is the regression coefficient. 
The italicized number is the t-statistic for each variable. 
Due to space limitation, the regression coefficients for each fixed-effect variable are not included 
          their effects are summarized in the analysis. 
* significant at the .05 level   
** significant at the .01 level               
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allocated to weak business segments which reduces the resources available for the better 
performing segments (Shim, 2010). Thus, it is not unexpected that excess liquidity will be 
positively related to total risk due to the resulting inefficiencies. 
In Model 1, the loan to asset ratio has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant. This ratio is positively related to total risk for banks. Loans are not liquid assets and 
banks who have a large amount of loans outstanding relative to their total assets might face a 
greater risk because illiquid assets cannot be used to address unexpected charges in the short run. 
The results for this variable were fairly consistent except in Model 2, when accounting for the 
fixed-effects of time. In Model 2, the relationship between the loan to asset ratio and total risk 
became negative but the result was statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient for the dividend payout ratio never yields any significant results. It is 
expected that this ratio is negatively related to total risk because this ratio can reflect 
management’s expectations about future net income. Dividend amounts are declared in advance 
of when they are issued, and higher dividend payout ratios could be an indicator that 
management is more confident that they can generate enough net income to cover the dividends 
paid amount. In most of the models, the coefficient was negative for the dividend payout ratio 
meaning it is negatively related to total risk, but the results were highly insignificant.  
The relationship between changes in the economic environment and total risk is 
statistically significant. As expected, growth in real GDP is negatively related to total risk. As an 
indicator of cyclical activity in the economy, it appears that declines in real GDP lead to greater 
total risk for banks. Likewise, periods of expanding economic output coincide with lower levels 
of risk for banks.  
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The anticipated effect of the growth in the money supply variable could not be 
determined ex ante, but the results indicate that this variable is negatively related to total risk. 
Perhaps, the injection of money into the economy by the Federal Reserve helps minimize the risk 
of illiquidity. When the money supply increases, banks have access to more capital which they 
can use to issue loans. The issuance of loans generates profit for banks which they can hold as 
cash reserves to improve liquidity or to deleverage and reduce interest expense. Either of these 
purposes could reduce total risk because they improve the financial strength of a bank.  
Results for the interest rate spread variable are statistically significant and produce the 
expected positive relationship with total risk. A larger spread between the 10 year Treasury bond 
and the Federal Funds rate can signal growing concern about future inflation rates. Inflation is a 
source of risk because it reduces the purchasing power of money which is why long term 
investors would demand an inflation premium, or a higher yield on long term securities, to 
compensate them for the chance that price levels in the economy could go up.  
These macroeconomic indicators yield the expected and significant results in most 
models that do not control for time. The inclusion of both economic variables and year fixed-
effect variables leads to highly insignificant results. The year fixed-effect variables aim to 
capture the unobserved characteristics that are present in each year of this study that could 
influence the total risk level for a bank. Financial regulations and the economic environment can 
change from year to year. Measures like the Basel Accords can be implemented which can 
influence a bank’s operations and indirectly, their risk level. Likewise, the recent troubles in the 
housing market that helped trigger the financial crisis could lead to a very significant change in 
the risk level that banks faced in the last couple of years. But the growth in money supply and 
real GDP variables might also capture some of the effects of time through naturally increasing 
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trends in these values. Over the 33 year period of this study, there might exist a natural growth in 
money supply or real GDP as technological advances help improve productivity and economic 
output improves and it could lead to problems with multicollinearity. The reason that the 
economic variables changed significance so much with the inclusion of the time fixed-effect 
variables might be due to too much overlapping of the captured effects of these variables. 
 The year fixed-effect variables created some disturbances in the results for the economic 
variables and the loan to asset ratio, but they also yielded some interesting results. The time 
fixed-effect dummy variable for the year 2007 was left out of all regressions so that it could be 
used as a benchmark for comparison purposes. The fixed-effect for each year before 2007 all had 
negative coefficients suggesting that there was more risk in 2007 than in any of the other years. 
Likewise, the coefficients for 2008, 2009 and 2010 all yielded positive coefficients suggesting 
that each of those years was more risky than 2007. These years coincide with the financial crisis, 
and due to the severe nature and volatility of that time period, it is expected that these years 
would display the highest risk. the results for these year fixed-effect variables remain consistent 
across the models. 
 For the firm fixed-effects, the dummy variable for Bank of America was left out of this 
regression for comparison purposes. The unobserved characteristics at JPMorgan Chase produce 
a negative relationship with total risk suggesting that the company is less risky than Bank of 
America. However, when controlling for time and firm fixed-effects, the JPMorgan Chase fixed-
effect variable is no longer significant. On the other hand, Berkshire Bancorp appears to be the 
most risky bank, since the unobserved characteristics present at this bank lead to 1.072 increase 
in the SDROE, which is by far the most for any bank in this study. The TrustCo Bank of New 
York appears to be the least risky bank in this study as the unobserved characteristics present at 
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this institution lead to a 0.042 decline in the SDROE, which is the smallest coefficient for a bank 
in this study. The results for the firm fixed-effect variables in Model 4 are consistent with the 
results of Model 3, except for a small number of firms. 
VI. Conclusion 
The regression results support the hypothesis of this study that changes in the economic 
environment significantly affect the total risk level faced by U.S. banks. Growth in real GDP, 
growth in the money supply and the spread between the yield on the 10 year Treasury note and 
Federal Funds Rate in the U.S. are significantly related to a bank’s total risk. The changing 
economic environment as a source of bank risk has been overlooked in other studies, but appears 
to be relevant based on the results of this study. 
In this study, bank size, the equity to asset ratio, allowance for loan loss ratio, liquidity ratio, 
loan to asset ratio, growth in real GDP, growth in the money supply and the interest rate spread 
all appear to be significantly related to total risk. The size of a bank, allowance for loan loss 
ratio, loan to asset ratio and the equity to asset ratio yield results that were consistent with prior 
research (Agusman et al., 2008; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and Zitz, 2003; Lee and 
Brewer, 1985). However, the Dividend Payout ratio and the liquidity ratio are found to be 
significant in other studies, but the dividend payout ratio is statistically insignificant and the 
liquidity ratio is significant but with the opposite sign from what is expected and supported by 
prior research. The difference in these results might be explained by the difference between this 
study and others. Other research that is mentioned in this paper use 44, 59 and 95 banks while 
this study uses a unique data set of 326 banks and spans 30 years as opposed to four. Perhaps, 
these ratios have had different effects on total risk, especially in the last decade, which is not 
included in prior studies.  
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As for future research, the influence of changes in the economic environment can be applied 
to market risk, the other major risk topic of research studies. Accounting data have been tested 
against both market and total risk. Changes in the economic environment can be regressed 
against measures of market risk to determine if a relationship exists there as well. Also, because 
this study includes companies that entered in later periods and left in earlier periods, it overlooks 
some of the effects associated with mergers and acquisitions. For instance a company might 
become incorporated in 1989, but then become acquired by a larger bank in 1994. If sufficient 
data is available, a study could be conducted to analyze how mergers and acquisitions affect the 





Appendix 1: List of Banks included in this Study
1st Source Corp                                
ACNB Corp                                      
Alliance Bankshares Corp                       
Alliance Financial Corp                        
American National Bankshares Inc              
American River Bankshares                      
Ameris Bancorp                                 
AmeriServ Financial Inc                        
Ames National Corp                             
Annapolis Bancorp Inc                          
Arrow Financial Corp                           
Associated Banc-Corp                           
Auburn National BanCorp Inc                    
BancFirst Corp                                 
Bancorp Inc (The)                              
Bancorp of New Jersey Inc                      
Bancorp Rhode Island Inc                       
BancorpSouth Inc0                              
BancTrust Financial Group Inc                  
Bank of America Corp                           
Bank of Commerce Holdings                      
Bank of Granite Corp                           
Bank of Hawaii Corp                            
Bank of Marin Bancorp                          
Bank of New York Mellon Corp (The)            
Bank of South Carolina Corp                    
Bank of the Carolinas                          
Bank of the Ozarks                             
Banner Corp                                    
Bar Harbor Bankshares                          
BB&T Corp                                      
Berkshire Bancorp Inc                          
BNC Bancorp                                    
BOK Financial Corp                             
Boston Private Financial Holdings Inc         
Bridge Bancorp Inc                             
Bridge Capital Holdings                        
Britton & Koontz Capital Corp                  
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp                            
C&F Financial Corp                             
Cadence Financial Corp                         
Camden National Corp                           
Cape Bancorp Inc                               
Capital Bank Corp                              
Capital City Bank Group                        
Cardinal Financial Corp                        
Carolina Bank Holdings Inc                     
Carrollton Bancorp                             
Cascade Bancorp                                
Cascade Financial Corp                         
Cathay General Bancorp                         
Center Bancorp Inc                             
Center Financial Corp                          
Centerstate Banks of Florida Inc               
Central Bancorp Inc/MA                         
Central Pacific Financial Corp0                
Central Valley Community Bancorp              
Central Virginia Bankshares Inc                
Centrue Financial Corp                         
Century BanCorp Inc                            
Chemical Financial Corp                        
Cheviot Financial Corp                         
Citizens & Northern Corp                       
Citizens First Corp                            
Citizens Holding Co                            
Citizens Republic Bancorp Inc                  
City Holding Co                                
City National Corp                             
CNB Financial Corp/PA                          
CoBiz Financial Inc                            
Colony Bankcorp Inc                            
Columbia Banking System Inc                    
Comerica Inc                                   
Commerce Bancshares Inc                        
Commercefirst Bancorp Inc                      
Commercial National Financial Corp            
Commonwealth Bankshares Inc                   
Community Bank Shares of Indiana Inc          
Community Bank System Inc0                    
Community Capital Corp                         
Community Central Bank Corp0                  
Community Partners Bancorp                     
Community Trust Bancorp Inc                    
Community West Bancshares                     
Crescent Financial Corp                        
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc                       
CVB Financial Corp                             
Dearborn Bancorp Inc                           
DNB Financial Corp                             
Eagle Bancorp Inc                              
East West Bancorp Inc0                         
Eastern Virginia Bankshares Inc               
ECB Bancorp Inc                                
Elmira Savings Bank FSB (The)                 
Emclaire Financial Corp                        
Encore Bancshares Inc                          
Enterprise Bancorp Inc/MA                      
Enterprise Financial Services Corp            
Evans Bancorp Inc                              
F0N0B0 Corp                                    
Farmers Capital Bank Corp                      
Fauquier Bankshares Inc                        
Fidelity Bancorp Inc                           
Fidelity Southern Corp                         
Fifth Third Bancorp                            
Financial Institutions Inc                     
First BanCorp (Puerto Rico)                    
First Bancorp Inc/ME (The)                     
First Bancorp/NC                               
First Bancshares Inc (The)/MS                 
First Busey Corp                               
First Business Financial Services Inc         
First California Financial Group Inc          
First Capital Bancorp Inc/VA                   
First Citizens Banc Corp                       
First Citizens BancShares Inc                  
First Commonwealth Financial Corp0            
First Community Bancshares Inc                
First Community Corp                           
First Federal of Northern Michigan 
Bancorp Inc 
First Financial Bancorp0                       
First Financial Bankshares Inc                 
First Financial Corp/IN                        
First Financial Service Corp                   
First Horizon National Corp                    
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First M & F Corp 
First Mariner Bancorp 
First Merchants Corp 
First Midwest Bancorp Inc 
First of Long Island Corp (The) 
First PacTrust Bancorp Inc 
First Security Group Inc 
First South Bancorp Inc 
First United Corp 
First West Virginia Bancorp Inc0 
Firstbank Corp 
FirstMerit Corp 
FNB United Corp 
FPB Bancorp Inc 
Fulton Financial Corp 
German American Bancorp Inc 
Glacier Bancorp Inc 
Glen Burnie Bancorp 
Great Southern Bancorp Inc 
Green Bankshares Inc 
Guaranty Bancorp 
Guaranty Federal Bancshares Inc 
Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc 
Hancock Holding Co 
Hanmi Financial Corp 
Harleysville Savings Bank 
Hawthorn Bancshares Inc 
Heartland Financial USA Inc 
Heritage Commerce Corp 
Heritage Oaks Bancorp 
Home Bancshares Inc 
Horizon Bancorp 
Hudson Valley Holding Corp 
Huntington Bancshares Inc 
IBERIABANK Corp 
Independent Bank Corp 
Independent Bank Corp0 
Integra Bank Corp 
International Bancshares Corp 
Intervest Bancshares Corp0 
Jacksonville Bancorp Inc/FL 
Jeffersonville Bancorp 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 
KeyCorp 
Lakeland Bancorp Inc 
Lakeland Financial Corp 
Landmark Bancorp Inc 
LNB Bancorp Inc 
M B T Financial Corp 
M&T Bank Corp 
Macatawa Bank Corp 
MacKinac Financial Corp 
MainSource Financial Group Inc 
Marshall & Ilsley Corp 
Mayflower Bancorp Inc 
Mercantile Bancorp Inc/IL 
Mercantile Bank Corp 
Merchants Bancshares Inc 
Metro Bancorp Inc 
MetroCorp Bancshares Inc 
Mid Penn Bancorp Inc0 
Middleburg Financial Corp 
MidSouth Bancorp Inc0 
MidWestOne Financial Group Inc 
Monarch Community Bancorp Inc 
Monarch Financial Holdings Inc 
MutualFirst Financial Inc 
Nara Bancorp Inc 
National Bankshares Inc 
National Penn Bancshares Inc 
NBT Bancorp Inc 
New Century Bancorp Inc0 
NewAlliance Bancshares Inc 
NewBridge Bancorp 
Northeast Bancorp 
Northern States Financial Corp 
Northern Trust Corp 
Northwest Bancshares Inc 
Norwood Financial Corp0 
Oak Ridge Financial Services Inc 
Ohio Legacy Corp 
Ohio Valley Banc Corp0 
Old Line Bancshares Inc 
Old National Bancorp 
Old Point Financial Corp 
Old Second Bancorp Inc 
OptimumBank Holdings Inc 
Oriental Financial Group Inc 
Oritani Financial Corp 
Orrstown Financial Services Inc 
PAB Bankshares Inc0 
Pacific Continental Corp 
Pacific Mercantile Bancorp 
Pacific Premier Bancorp Inc 
PacWest Bancorp 
Park National Corp 
Parke Bancorp Inc 
Patriot National Bancorp Inc 
Penns Woods Bancorp Inc 
Peoples Bancorp Inc 
Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina Inc0 
Peoples Financial Corp/MS 
Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc 
PNC Financial Services Group Inc0 
Popular Inc 
Porter Bancorp Inc 
Premier Financial Bancorp Inc 
PremierWest Bancorp 
Princeton National Bancorp Inc 
PrivateBancorp Inc 
Prosperity Bancshares Inc 
QCR Holdings Inc 
Regions Financial Corp 
Renasant Corp 
Republic Bancorp Inc 
Republic First Bancorp Inc 
Rockville Financial Inc 
Royal Bancshares of Pennsylvania Inc 
Rurban Financial Corp 
S&T Bancorp Inc 
S0Y0 Bancorp Inc0 
Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc 
Savannah Bancorp Inc (The) 
SCBT Financial Corp 
Seacoast Banking Corp of Florida 
Severn Bancorp Inc 





Simmons First National Corp 
Somerset Hills Bancorp 
Southcoast Financial Corp 
Southern Community Financial Corp 
Southern Connecticut Bancorp Inc 
Southern First Bankshares Inc 
Southern National Bancorp of Virginia 
Inc 
Southside Bancshares Inc 
Southwest Bancorp Inc 
Southwest Georgia Financial Corp 
State Bancorp Inc0 
State Street Corp 
StellarOne Corp 
Sterling Bancorp 
Sterling Bancshares Inc 
Stewardship Financial Corp 
Suffolk Bancorp 
Summit Financial Group Inc 
SunTrust Banks Inc0 
Superior Bancorp 
Susquehanna Bancshares Inc 
Sussex Bancorp 
SVB Financial Group 
Synovus Financial Corp0 
Taylor Capital Group Inc 
TCF Financial Corp 
Tennessee Commerce Bancorp 
Texas Capital Bancshares Inc 
TIB Financial Corp 
Tidelands Bancshares Inc 
Tompkins Financial Corp 
Tower Bancorp Inc 
Tower Financial Corp 
TriCo Bancshares 
TrustCo Bank Corp NY 
Trustmark Corp 
U0S0 Bancorp 
UMB Financial Corp 
Union Bankshares Inc 
Union First Market Bankshares Corp 
United Bancorp Inc 
United Bancshares Inc/OH 
United Bankshares Inc 
United Community Banks Inc 
United Security Bancshares 
United Security Bancshares Inc 
United Western Bancorp Inc 
Unity Bancorp Inc 
Univest Corp of Pennsylvania 
Valley National Bancorp 
Village Bank and Trust Financial Corp 
Virginia Commerce Bancorp 
VIST Financial Corp 
VSB Bancorp Inc/NY 
Waccamaw Bankshares Inc 
Washington Banking Co 
Washington Trust Bancorp Inc 
Webster Financial Corp 
Wells Fargo & Co 
WesBanco Inc 
West Bancorporation Inc 
West Coast Bancorp 
Westamerica Bancorporation 
Western Alliance Bancorporation 
Whitney Holding Corp0 
Wilber Corp 
Wilmington Trust Corp 
Wilshire Bancorp Inc 
Wintrust Financial Corp0 
WSFS Financial Corp 
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